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[This article examines the character of the university student in law in the 
context of wide-ranging changes to Australian higher education since the 
1980s. The legal character of the student derives from two major sources: 
establishment of a university jurisdiction, primarily under State University 
Acts, and federal higher education funding legislation. With the rise of 
market/economic conditions in the sector, the student has become subject 
to tensions between these sources of law, increasingly resolved in terms of 
his/her existence as a “consumer” within a commercial university model. 
Alongside the older statutory university jurisdictions, the standing of the 
student is both increasingly complex and impoverished.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
Student subjectivity may be understood as the collective actions, behaviours, pro-
pensities or characteristics of those undertaking study in the universities. It may be 
understood as the legal-cultural conditions of that part of the population engaged in 
university education. This article reviews the circumstances of the student in law, as 
well as commenting on the interaction of the legal and political-economic circum-
stances affecting Australian university students.  
Construction of subjectivities and model actors in the law is a relatively common 
affair (eg the notion of a “reasonable” person), although this practice has not really 
been extended to students. The student in Australian universities may be interpo-
lated from an implied statutory model of the university and the student-university 
relationship, and by the historic treatment of this relationship by the courts. This 
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model, however, must be read in the context of sweeping changes to higher educa-
tion policy and administration since the late 1980s, under the direction of the Fed-
eral Government.  
In the longer-term, these changes may be described as the shift from a craft-like 
model of the university to a commercial, or business, model. This “enterprise uni-
versity” has had an enormous impact on the student condition, which has yet to be 
fully accounted for in the law. 
Passage of new higher education funding laws in the form of the Higher Education 
Support Act 2003 will have important impacts on the operation of universities, 
representing further development of a market-economic model. Concurrent, far-
reaching changes in student “experience” represent cultural and sociological 
changes to student subjectivity, with greater emphasis placed upon instrumental, 
economic values, such as the acquisition of credentials and jobs/careers. From the 
perspective of the student, a tension between the ascendant economic condi-
tions/model and the statutory and historic model of the university (as is presented in 
various University Acts) has largely been overlooked. It is not a tension that can 
easily be resolved, although, given a tightening market nexus, the courts may be 
eventually called upon to revise their views of the student as a bearer of rights, 
especially in the absence of a political will to treat the student as anything more 
than a “consumer” of “educational services”.    
II THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP  
In Australia, universities are self-governing authorities constituted (for the most 
part) under State Acts. The primary purposes of the university is the provision of 
higher education, research and scholarship, and the awarding of degrees, but they 
are not normally precluded from engaging in, and regulating themselves for the 
purposes of, other related activities (Eg community service, commercial and trading 
activities). Consistent with the British model, an Australian public university will 
be established as a “body corporate and politic,” comprising a University Council 
(or equivalent), staff, undergraduate and graduate students, and possibly alumni.1 A 
machinery of self-government, including powers to make by-laws or statutes with 
the effect of law in relation to its functions, and establishment of an academic 
college (such as an Academic Board), are typically provided for in the establishing 
Act. The public character of the Australian university has been stated by the courts 
in Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney.2  
The student in effect is a member or constituent of the University and is “bound by 
its statutes and regulations.”3 The student is claimed to be part of an “academic 
1 “The University consists of the Council, members of the academic staff, members of the general staff, 
graduates and students.” University of Adelaide Act 1971, sub4(2) (SA);  Cf. University of Tasmania 
Act, 1992, sub5(1) (Tas.); Melbourne University Act 1958, s4 (Vic). 
2 Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney, [1964] NSWSR 723, 727. 
3 Melbourne University Act, 1958, s4 (Vic). 
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community,” which derives its understanding from a “domestic” arrangement4 for 
the purposes of learning, and which has been expressed as a convocation.5 By 
implication, the student is a type of internal citizen, with obligations to academic 
processes and rules, in short the jurisdiction of the university, as well as a right to 
engage in the body politic via the mechanisms of internal self-government.6
The university’s establishment of itself as a jurisdiction in relation to academic 
issues is a matter that the courts have been very reluctant to intrude on. It is an issue 
that goes to the heart of the student as a legal subject, as this has informed what 
other legal relationship the student may have with the university, in particular 
whether, of what character, and to what extent the relationship is contractual. The 
legal character of the student revolves around the space of exclusivity of the univer-
sity’s own jurisdiction created by the courts. The courts have viewed universities as 
powers unto themselves when it comes to the objects or purposes set out for them in 
their Acts.  
III THE VISITATORIAL JURISDICTION  
The jurisdiction of the university is historically associated with the office of the 
Visitor.7 This office may actually adjudicate in matters of internal dispute, or it may 
be a ceremonial office, or it may be abolished entirely. What is of significance is 
the operation of a visitatorial jurisdiction, which may be understood as the aca-
demic rule- and decision-making domain of the university. Its product is a little 
checked and antiquated authoritarianism over the student.  
In Thorne v University of London, the British High Court declined to review a 
matter relating to student examinations. Diplock LJ held that “The principle is that 
at common law the court has no jurisdiction to deal with the internal affairs or 
government of the university, for those have been confided by law to the exclusive 
4 See JRS FORBES, DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNALS [2.16] (1996).  
5 The term convocation is actually used or applied to the total body of members of the University. See 
for instance, University of Sydney Act 1989, s14: 
“… Convocation 
     (1) Convocation consists of: 
          (a) the Fellows and former Fellows of the Senate, 
          (b) the graduates of the University, 
          (c) the persons referred to in section 34, 
          (d) the professors and full-time members of the academic 
          staff of the University and such other members or classes 
          of members of the staff of the University as the by-laws 
          may prescribe, and 
          (e) such graduates of other universities, or other persons, 
          as are, in accordance with the by-laws, admitted as members 
          of Convocation…”. 
6 Most University legislation makes provision for elected student representatives on governing and 
decision-making bodies.  
7 For a comprehensive UK study on “the Visitor”, see David Palfreyman, A bibliographical essay on the 
visitor, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR MANAGERS 340 (David Palyreyman and 
David Warner , eds., 1997). 
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province of the visitor.”8 His Honour further states: “The High Court does not act 
as a court of appeal from university examiners.”9 In Patel v Bradford University 
Senate, the court held “that the court’s have no jurisdiction over matters within the 
visitor’s jurisdiction.”10 The exclusive jurisdiction of the visitor is upheld in the 
Australian jurisdiction.11 In Bayley-Jones, the court commented on the “special role 
of the visitor in the unique environment in which his [sic] functions fall to be per-
formed,” and the necessity that the visitor would “take into account the welfare of 
the university as a whole.”12  
The courts restrict their role solely to one of judicial review, and a jurisdiction for 
the courts can be found in this principle.13 The intervention of the courts in student 
cases has, then, often turned on the question of a denial of natural justice, notably in 
cases involving student discipline or unsatisfactory academic performance. A lever 
into the student-university relationship may be administrative law, and review 
procedures provided for in this body of law. Under the Victorian Administrative 
Law Act 1978, for instance, decisions taken by university tribunals are reviewable 
by the Courts with respect to the application of principles of natural justice. This 
test is somewhat distinct from that in some other Australian jurisdictions.14
It is also worth considering the operation of the visitatorial jurisdiction in the ab-
sence of that actual office. The Victorian Government recently abolished the pow-
ers of the visitor across all Victorian universities.15 The actual operation of this 
jurisdiction would likely fall to University Councils. There may be a role for review 
by the relevant Ombudsman. Under the ombudsman’s jurisdiction, the scope for 
administrative review is potentially more far-reaching than under the terms of 
administrative law. The Ombudsman may address disputes within universities as 
“public statutory bodies,”16 in relation to an “administrative action.” The scope of 
such action is wider than merely tribunal decisions. The Ombudsman’s jurisdiction 
may require all internal avenues of dispute to be exhausted. It also suggests that the 
student-university relationship has come to assume, or be updated in terms of, in 




8  Thorne v University of London, [1966] 2 QB 237, 240.  
9  Thorne v University of London, [1966] 2 QB 237,  243. 
10 Patel v Bradford University Senate, [1978] 1 WLR 1488, 1493E. 
11 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle, (1990) 22 NSWLR 424. 
12 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle, (1990) 22 NSWLR 424, 431B-C. 
13 “The visitor is not free from all control by the courts. Thus prohibition will lie to restrain him from 
exceeding his jurisdiction, and so will mandamus if he refuses to exercise it”: Patel v Bradford Univer-
sity Senate, [1978] 1 WLR 1488, 1493F. 
14 See discussion of Griffith v Tang, [2005] HCA 7 (3 March 2005) below. 
15 University Acts (Amendment) Act, 2003, (Vic). 
16 See Ex parte Forster; Re University of Sydney, 1963 NSWSR 723, 727. 
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IV IS THE STUDENT DEFINED BY AN                               
ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONSHIP? 
The exclusivity of the visitor’s jurisdiction poses the question as to the nature of the 
“internal,” academic-legal relationship to which the student is subject. What is the 
nature of the academic judgement the student faces? Academic decisions, i.e. the 
ones made by academic teaching staff, are founded on the power of the university 
to confer degrees and their responsibility to deliver academic programs. Students 
find themselves in this academic nexus: between knowledge transmission and its 
formal organisation and certification, between knowledge and credentials. Within 
this structure, academic decisions are based on grading and assessment (hence 
ranking). These decisions, hundreds of thousands of them every year, give effect to 
the “core functions” and legislative “objects” of the university.  
Academic decisions are not administrative decisions; they do not represent “admin-
istrative actions.” This process, however, embodied in grading and assessment, 
might be said to be embedded in administrative action and arrangements. The 
administrative density of the regulatory regime has expanded considerably with the 
introduction of the HESA. Notwithstanding the series of Administrative Guidelines, 
regulations and notices accompanying the Act, there are 293 discrete provisions 
(sections) of the HESA, as against 120 in the Higher Education Funding Act 1988, 
and negligible regulation pre-1989 (under the States Grants Acts regime). This does 
not account for the qualitative effects of regulation, but is testament to educational 
experience and institutional action heavily inscribed by administrative rules and 
action. These are the conditions and context in which academic judgements are 
made, and in which qualifications are sought. It might be said that scholastic par-
ticipation has become an object of layers of executive and delegated power. If the 
academic relation is not directly regulated in this manner, the academic world of the 
student is.  
V IS THE STUDENT DEFINED BY A DUTY OWED TO HIM/HER? 
The concept of the student as a beneficiary of a duty, owed by the university, is also 
a subjective factor, currently being remodelled in the context of the corporate char-
acter of the institution and a seeming litigiousness of students, eg with respect to 
trade practices legislation. Duty constructs a framework of “protective” entitlement 
of the student. In the contemporary context, this equates to economic protection 
(against misleading action or poor quality “products”) of the student as consumer.  
This is reinforced by universities’ emphasis of body corporate status to the almost 
total exclusion of a political or representative dimension to their operations. HESA 
refers to universities solely as bodies corporate (s.16D). Consequently, the concept 
of a duty, owed to the student as a type of customer, implies the student as vulner-
able if not ineffectual in relation to the production and/or scrutiny of courses and 
services provided and of actions taken by the institution. While student actions in 
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tort have been taken in relation to misrepresentation by universities,17 the construc-
tion of duties in relation to university statutory functions has emerged rather more 
by application of the analogy of economic tort – that is to say, in relation to quality 
of provision. Historically such standards were maintained through mechanisms of 
self-accreditation and self-government. With the rise of an economic (corporate) 
model, more bureaucratic/technocratic systems have been imposed.  
The elaborate “quality assurance” machinery of the universities, complemented by 
subdivisions 19-C and 19-D of the HESA, represent means of contending with the 
new regime of duties owed to the student (and the wider public). In the quality 
assurance situation, duty represents an insulated form of right, managed by institu-
tional authorities on behalf of students, and now overseen by statute. The student 
has, at best, a highly mediated, individualised form of power. They become a com-
plainant, a bearer of grievances, and a candidate for remedy. Consistent with the 
corporate paradigm, any cause of action by the student is seen as private.  
The concept of duty owed to students was not always this technocratic. The current 
situation largely evolves out of the corporate model of the university. Notions of 
duty also attached to the in loco parentis doctrine. Although this doctrine has had 
little currency in Australia, it has been influential in North America. It has histori-
cally been called on to explain the student-university relationship, and derives from 
early, small, denominational college environments, where the moral development of 
students was seen to be inextricable from academic formation. Literally meaning 
that the institutional authority will “stand in the place of the parent,” the familial 
model allowed the courts to defer almost entirely to the rule of the col-
lege/university, the limits of its power only being actions that were arbitrary and 
capricious.  
VI DOES THE STUDENT HAVE A CONTRACT? 
It is more common for a contract to be implied in the student-university relation-
ship. The issue of a contract arose in Bayley-Jones. In considering the visitatorial 
question in Clark v The University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, the English 
Court of Appeal found a contract to exist between a student and a university, and, 
while clearly reluctant to involve the courts in anything other than a strictly super-
visory function, conceded that judicial intervention may extend beyond this because 
of the contractual nature.18 Nevertheless, what the courts have tended to do is 
determine the form of the relationship as contractual and identify the terms of that 
contract as based on the university’s rules, procedures and decisions. The idea of a 
contract may provide the student with some rights within the university, but the 
terms of the contract weigh heavily in the favour of the institution. Dodd19 has 
17 See Fennell v Australian National University, [1999] FCA 989 (22 July 1999); Philip Clarke, Univer-
sity Marketing and the Law: Applying the Trade Practices Act to Universities’ Marketing and Promo-
tional Activities, 8 DEAKIN L. REV. 304 (2003). 
18 Clark v The University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, [2000] ELR 345. 
19 Victoria Dodd, The non-contractual nature of the student-university contractual relationship, 33 U. 
KAN. L. REV.  701 (1985). 
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argued that the attribution of a contract at all to the student-university relationship is 
unsound and leads to perverse and oppressive outcomes, given precisely (Ameri-
can) courts’ propensities to load the burden of implied terms on the student over the 
institution. The implied terms of the contract are oppressive, but also uncertain, 
vague and indeterminate. The distance in effect of a contract recognisable as com-
mercial and that “negotiated” between the student and the university is so great as 
to “strain” the understanding of contract: “There is little in the student-university 
relationship, particularly as it has been viewed by the courts, that reflects principles 
and policies that are associated with theories of contract.”20 One can argue then that 
the nascent “contractual rights” expressed in Bayley-Jones (“a reflection of the rules 
of the University”),21 are highly formalistic and provide little in the way of benefit 
to the student in dispute over academic rules and decisions. The peculiar contract of 
the student does not appear to advance their position as a member of the university, 
notably in relation to other “members” such as the University Council. The situa-
tion is further affected by the fact that the greater regulating force over the universi-
ties and the student is not the law per se but financing, that is by de facto conditions 
determined by federal policy. Arguably, recent changes to federal higher education 
legislation have reinforced a notion of a student-university contract. 
VII THE DE FACTO ROLE OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
Significant changes are currently being implemented in university regulation as a 
result of passage of the HESA. Since the 1970s, conditions attached to federal 
funding have been used extensively to shape the university. By extension they have 
strongly influenced the character of the student. The student is defined under fed-
eral legislation simply as a person enrolled in a recognised course of study. In law, 
the definition of a student would appear to be a relatively technical question. The 
bigger issue arises in the use of law in public policy.  
Major federal intervention into higher education came with the Whitlam Govern-
ment’s decision in 1974 to abolish university fees. The instrument under which this 
occurred was a pre-existing funding mechanism, the States Grants Acts, under 
which new appropriations occurred annually. The legislation provided for grants to 
institutions. The bigger shift in federal university legislation came with the Higher 
Education Funding Act 1988. The introduction of HECS, full-fee paying markets 
for international (and then postgraduate and then undergraduate) students, tendering 
for funds, and the decline in government funding (to around half of 1980s levels) 
subjected the university to the competitive pressures of a pseudo-corporation in a 
marketplace. The student emerged as an economic subject, as an actor within a 
supply chain leading to the flow of credentials (and the skills signified by them) 
onto the labour market. The effect of the HEFA was a creeping “consumerisation” 
of the student. 
20 Id. at 72. 
21 Bayley-Jones v University of Newcastle, (1990) 22 NSWLR 424, 436A. 
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The HESA goes one step further, where “the market order becomes the dominant 
mode of organisation.”22 For the first time, the HESA establishes the government as 
de facto purchaser of higher education programs, from university “providers,” on 
behalf of students/consumers, who in turn are provided with a voucher-style loan in 
order to access these “government-purchased” programs. Part of the voucher may 
be “consumed” at overseas institutions. The voucher structure in the HESA (Stu-
dent Learning Entitlement) is explicitly referred to as being “consumed” by a stu-
dent in the course of their enrolment/study.23
Already the “quasi-market” order developed after 1988 led to new cultural and 
sociological realities for students, in which they became habituated to the money-
nexus (as fees, debt, or scarcity of places), and found “participation” in university 
an increasingly privatised and instrumental experience. Universities viewed them-
selves and acted as corporate institutions, where executive power reigned largely 
unchecked over internal quasi-legislative (collegiate) decision-making.24 Recent 
research on the “student experience” has highlighted a phenomenon of student 
“disengagement” from the university.25 On-campus experience has been heavily 
diluted by other pressures, notably paid work and family responsibility.26 Peda-
gogically, depth of thinking (and the reading and writing associated with it) has 
been replaced by efficiency in the completion of tasks and in interactions (including 
electronic-visual interactions).27 For the student, an enormous tension exists be-
tween “participation” as an economic actor/consumer and a more authentic partici-
pation as a “member” of the university.  
VIII THE HIGH COURT INTERVENES:                                               
GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY V TANG 
On 3 March 2005, the High Court handed down its decision in the case of Griffith 
University v Tang.28 This decision is significant not least because of the rarity of 
any dispute between a student and a University being appealed to a superior court, 
let alone reaching the High Court of Australia. It is also significant for the broad (if 
tortuous) statement made by the High Court on the student-university relationship. 
The High Court found that the relationship between the student and university is not 
primarily one of public law; instead the private, contractual character of the rela-
22 Simon Marginson, They Make a Desolation and They Call It FA Hayek, AUSTRALIAN BOOK REVIEW 
260 (April 2004). 
23 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCTION SCIENCE AND TRAINING, ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION FOR 
PROVIDERS s31 (2005). 
24 SIMON MARGINSON AND MARK CONSIDINE, THE ENTERPRISE UNIVERSITY: POWER, GOVERNANCE 
AND REINVENTION IN AUSTRALIA (2000). 
25 CRAIG MCINNIS, SIGNS OF DISENGAGEMENT? THE CHANGING UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN 
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES (2001). 
26 CRAIG MCINNIS AND ROBYN HARTLEY, MANAGING STUDY AND WORK: THE IMPACT OF FULL-TIME 
STUDY AND PAID WORK ON THE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE IN AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES (2002). 
27 Judith Langridge, The Backyard Blitz Syndrome: The Emerging Student Culture In Australian Higher 
Education, TRANSFORMATIONS 7 (2003). 
28 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7 (3 March 2005). 
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tionship prevails. This is consistent in principle with an economic/consumer charac-
terisation of the student.  
The dispute originated out of the University’s decision to exclude the student Tang 
from a PhD program on grounds of academic misconduct; specifically that she had 
fabricated experimental data in her research. The decision to exclude the student 
was made by an internal university committee established for student disciplinary 
purposes. The student sought to have the matter reviewed under Queensland’s 
Judicial Review Act 1991 (“JRA”), arguing that the University’s decision had inter 
alia breached the requirements of natural justice. The University failed twice, first 
in the Supreme Court of Queensland and then on appeal to the Full Court of the 
Supreme Court, to have the matter struck out. However, in a 4:1 finding, a majority 
of the judges in the High Court overturned the decisions of the lower Courts and 
found in favour of the University.  
The case turned upon whether or not, for the purposes of review under the JRA, the 
decision by the University to exclude the student was a decision “made under an 
enactment.” By majority, the Court found that it was not; the disciplinary powers 
used to exclude the student were not wielded under statute but were affected by the 
University in its capacity to establish a private and contractual relationship with the 
student which exists under the general law of the land.29  
The Chief Justice reasoned as follows: 
There is nothing in the Griffith University Act 1988 (Q) which deals spe-
cifically with matters of admission to or exclusion from a research pro-
gram or any course of study, academic misconduct, or intra-mural 
procedures for dealing with issues of the kind that arise in the case of the 
respondent.30  
On that basis, the Chief Justice found that the powers to admit and exclude arose 
from “the general power to do anything necessary or convenient” in connection 
with the specific objects and powers that were specified under the Act.  
The legal construction of the majority in respect of the student is that s/he exists 
within a contractual (private) sphere provided for by statute (public law).  
In the sole dissenting judgment, Kirby J31 criticised the “unduly narrow ap-
proach”32 of the majority.   In his view, the only source of the University’s power to 
make the decision was under the University Act.  Had it been made under any other 
source of power, it would have been unlawful.33  This decision, being an “adminis-
trative” decision, the review of which was sought by a “person aggrieved”, ought 
therefore be reviewable under the JRA.34   On a policy basis, he added:  
29 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7 , [82] 
30 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7, [8]. 
31 Kirby J was a former University Chancellor of Macquarie University 1984 – 1993. 
32 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7, [99]. 
33 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7, [159]. 
34 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7, [168]. 
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Where bodies, such as Australian universities, specifically the appellant, 
are recipients of large amounts of public funds, they cannot complain 
when, like other statutory authorities and public decision makers, they are 
rendered accountable in the courts for the lawfulness of the decisions they 
make “under” public enactments.  It is not unreasonable that such bodies 
should be answerable for their conformity to the law.  Relevantly, the law 
includes the law of procedural fairness (“natural justice”).  Universities, in 
formal and important decisions about disciplinary matters affecting stu-
dents and others, should be places of procedural fairness.35  
The sharply differing opinions on the Court over the organisation of public and 
private law in the university point to the diverging threads of treatment and disposi-
tion of the student in law: as private or public subject. 
IX RESOLVING THE TENSION VIA THE CONTRACT? 
Growth of the market nexus in the student-university relationship militates toward a 
contractual reading of the relationship. This is encouraged, for instance, by invest-
ment in apparatuses of “quality assurance.” It seems increasingly likely that, in the 
context of a language of consumerism and service-delivery, disputes will refer to 
the relationship in contract. The very inflationary environment of university fees 
would also suggest that pressure on the courts to apply something approaching 
commercial terms to the academic contract will increase in the longer-term. Reports 
of high demand degrees topping $100,000 are now common. Reports of academic 
staff feeling pressured to pass full-fee-paying international students are relatively 
commonplace.36  With cultural and technological changes on campus, questions 
regarding academic misconduct, such as plagiarism, have also become more com-
plex and obscure – and at the same time, these practices have become widespread, 
even mainstream. University administrations and non-academic functions are now 
complex and labyrinthine. Under cost pressures, and with large investments in 
money and time, students might be excused for feeling that their contract with the 
university is for a credential rather than merely for “educational services.” It re-
mains to be seen how far the courts will intervene into the academic (visitatorial) 
domain in pursuit of breach of contract. Precedence hitherto suggests not far. The 
equation of the academic process with service-delivery rather than a quasi-domestic 
arrangement (craft-like transmission of knowledge from scholar to student), and the 
importance of administrative systems over personal-professional relationships, 
would tend, however, to promote judicial scrutiny. For instance, as academic func-
tions are casualised and/or disaggregated (eg teaching and marking handled by 
separate people) and the market nexus made more explicit, disputes over academic 
judgement may find their way to the courts as claims over service-delivery, or the 
lack thereof.  
35 Griffith University v Tang, [2005] HCA 7, [170]. 
36 See eg.  Senate Employment, Workplace Relations, Small Business and Education References Com-
mittee UNIVERSITIES IN CRISIS: REPORT INTO THE CAPACITY OF PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES TO MEET 
AUSTRALIA'S HIGHER EDUCATION NEEDS (2001).
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X WHAT OF THE “BODY POLITIC”? 
The initial premise of most university legislation is, on the face of it, quite a democ-
ratic one: the student is a constituent of the university. The reality is that the student 
is treated as an object of the university’s corporate character (eg “cohort”), subject 
to the rules and decisions of an academic and administrative jurisdiction. That 
jurisdiction has essentially been appropriated by an executive, or managerial, class. 
The condition overlooked in all of this is that a political/legislative (and hence 
democratic and representative) function also exists at the heart of the university 
concept. With respect to students, it is a condition nominally given effect by a small 
number of elected student representative positions on governing councils, boards, 
committees or senates. Historically, the notion has also been observed in official 
sanction and support for student unions or student representative councils. Until the 
1980s most of these were unincorporated bodies operating under university by-
laws. With respect to political operation more generally, some university councils 
and academic boards/senates have proved a thorn in the side of managements and 
Vice-Chancellors, and have held them accountable. With a long tradition of direct 
action and protest, students have on occasion sought to give political substance to 
their political status. The decade long assault on student organisations, however, has 
taken its toll on student political practices, whether representative or direct.  
Now the body politic of the university appears in law as an anomaly, in the face of 
corporate and public-policy realities. Most managements have sought to reduce 
institutional democracy to an advisory function, or neutralise it entirely. It is a type 
of internal “imperial” mode of government, under the Vice-Chancellor. Even statu-
tory representative bodies, such as Academic Boards, are treated as remnant and 
paid lip-service. Student representativeness within this framework hardly registers 
on the imperial radar. The political, or internal governmental principle nonetheless 
remains, and provides the only real basis for a democratic revision of the university 
– and therefore an assertion of the student as more than a “consumer,” as a public 
actor and decision-maker. Resuscitation of the body politic will need to make 
reference to the now-industrial, mass circumstances of higher education provision. 
But as contemporary universities resemble small municipalities,37 more than intel-
lectual workshops or families, there would appear to be a greater, not lesser, im-
perative for democracy.  
 
37 Brian. Jackson, The lingering legacy of In Loco Parentis: An historical survey and proposal for 
reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135 (1991). 
